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Originally Posted by Troianii Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore is being scammed, just like the rest of us. In a moment I will prove that with just one word. Yes, just one word. As we learn in high school, judges are the interpreters of our laws. They don't write laws, they interpret them. Judges read the words the legislative branch has written and passed; examine the obvious meaning of those words and the context in which they are found; and when there is an ambiguity, they research and consider the legislative history surrounding the text of the law to discover what the legislators meant when they passed it.

CHAPTER V.

RULES OF INTERPRETATION.

§ 397. IN our future commentaries upon the constitution we shall treat it, then, as it is denominated in the instrument itself, as a CONSTITUTION of government, ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves and their posterity. 1 They have declared it the supreme law of the land. They have made it a limited government. They have defined its authority. They have restrained it to the exercise of certain powers, and reserved all others to the states or to the people. It is a popular government. Those who administer it are responsible to the people. It is as popular, and Just as much emanating from the people, as the state governments. It is created for one purpose; the state governments for another. It may be altered, and amended, and abolished at the will of the people. In short, it was made by the people, made for the people, and is responsible to the people. 2

§ 398. In this view of the matter, let us now proceed to consider the rules, by which it ought to be interpreted; for, if these rules are correctly laid down, it will save us from many embarrassments in examining and defining its powers. Much of the difficulty, which has arisen in all the public discussions on this subject, has had its origin in the want of some uniform rules of interpretation, expressly or tacitly agreed on by the disputants. Very different doctrines on this point have been adopted by different commentators; and not unfrequently very different language held by the same parties at different periods. In short, the rules of interpretation have often been shifted to suit the emergency; and the passions and prejudices of the day, or the favour and odium of a particular measure, have not unfrequently furnished a mode of argument, which would, on the one hand, leave the constitution crippled and inanimate, or, on other hand, give it an extent and elasticity, subversive of all rational boundaries.

§ 399. Let us, then, endeavour to ascertain, what are the true rules of interpretation applicable to the constitution; so that we may have some fixed standard, by which to measure its powers, and limit its prohibitions, and guard its obligations, and enforce its securities of our rights and liberties.

§ 400. I. The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is, to construe them according to the sense of the terms, and the intention of the parties. Mr. Justice Blackstone has remarked, that the intention of a law is to be gathered from the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the reason and spirit of the law. 3 He goes on to justify the remark by stating, that words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification, not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and popular use; that if words happen to be dubious, their meaning may be established by the context, or by comparing them with other words and sentences in the same instrument; that illustrations may be further derived from the subject-matter, with reference to which the expressions are used; that the effect and consequence of a particular construction is to be examined, because, if a literal meaning would involve a manifest absurdity, it ought not to be adopted; and that the reason and spirit of the law, or the causes, which led to its enactment, are often the best exponents of the words, and limit their application. 4

§ 401. Where the words are plain and clear, and the sense distinct and perfect arising on them, there is generally no necessity to have recourse to other means of interpretation. It is only, when there is some ambiguity or doubt arising from other sources, that interpretation has its proper office. There may be obscurity, as to the meaning, from the doubtful character of the words used, from other clauses in the same instrument, or from an incongruity or repugnancy between the words, and the apparent intention derived from the whole structure of the instrument, or its avowed object. In all such cases interpretation becomes indispensable.

1. "The government of the Union," says Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, " is emphatically and truly a government of the people. It emanates from them; its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them and for their benefit." Id. 404, 405; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. R. 264, 413, 414. "The government of the United States was erected," says Mr. Chancellor Kent, with equal force and accuracy, " by the free voice and the joint will of the people of America for their common defence and general welfare." 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 10, p. 189.

2. I have used the expressive words of Mr. Webster, deeming them as exact as any that could be used. See Webster's Speeches, p, 410, 418, 419; 4 Elliot's Debates, 338, 343.

3. 1 Black. Comm. 59, 60. See also Ayliffe's Pandects, B. 1, tit 4, p. 25, &c.; 1 Domat. Prelim. Book, p. 9; Id. Treatise on Laws, ch. 12, p. 74.

4. Id. See also Woodes. Elem. of Jurisp. p. 36. -- Rules of a similar nature will be found laid down in Vattel, B. 2, ch. 17, from §262 to 310, with more ample illustrations and more various qualifications. But not a few of his rules appear to me to want accuracy and soundness. Bacon's Abridg. title, Statute I. contains an excellent summary of the rules for construing statutes. Domat, also, contains many valuable rule in respect to interpretation. See his Treatise on Laws, c. 12, p. 74 &c. and Preliminary Discourse, tit. 1, §2, p. 6 to 16.

Joseph Story: Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: Book 3 Chapter 5

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Originally Posted by Troianii If you think the Founders supported the doctrine of separation of church and state, consider these quotes: The U.S. Supreme Court also said in the same case, "Our laws and our institution must necessarily be based upon and embody the teachings of the Redeemer of Mankind. It is impossible that it should be otherwise. In this sense and to this extend, our civilization and our institutions are emphatically Christian."

But in what sense can it be called a Christian nation? Not in the sense that Christianity is the established religion or that people are in any matter compelled to support it. On the contrary, the Constitution specifically provides that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' Neither is it Christian in the sense that all of its citizens are either in fact or name Christian. On the contrary, all religions have free scope within our borders. Numbers of our people profess other religions, and many reject all. Nor is it Christian in the sense that a profession of Christianity is a condition of holding office or otherwise engaging in public service, or essential to recognition either politically or socially. In fact, the government as a legal organization is independent of all religions.

Source: The United States A Christian Nation, by David J. Brewer, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, The John C. Winston Company (1905) pp 11-12 .

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Originally Posted by Troianii The final version of the First Amendment says, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Part of the legislative history of the First Amendment includes a longer version that included the words, "...nor shall any national religion be established...".

4. AS to the effects and confequence, the rule is, where words bear either none, or a very abfurd fignification, if literally underftood, we muft a little deviate from the received fenfe of them. Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf m, which enacted “that whoever drew blood in the ftreets fhould be punifhed with the utmoft *****ity,” was held after long debate not to extend to the furgeon, who opened the vein of a perfon that fell down in the ftreet with a fit.

Blackstone's Commentaries - Introduction