donsutherland1

In the wake of the recent violence provoked by radical Islamists who had been using Islamabad's Red Mosque as a base from which to spread their harsh ideology and Pakistan's efforts to thwart such efforts, the Nawi-i-Waqt (pro-Muslim League) issued a statement that declared, "We say President Musharraf should demonstrate realism. He should think about an honourable retreat. He should take the people into his confidence through a broadcast speech as to when is he going to transfer power to the people." The call to "transfer power to the people" signals that the group wants President Musharraf to resign in favor of Islamist movements that seek power.

Since then, terrorists have carried out a series of suicide bomb attacks, mainly in northwest Pakistan. These attacks have killed some 70 persons. These attacks have been carried out in a bid to destabilize the Musharraf government. At the same time, growing instability in Afghanistan could also have an adverse effect in Pakistan.

In an "unusually blunt warning," Kabul's Pajhwok Afghan News website reported, "the British military chiefs told Downing Street the campaign in Afghanistan was facing 'a catastrophic failure' that could pave the ground for an Islamist government coming to power in Pakistan."

As Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, the fall of President Musharraf to pro-Taliban elements, could well constitute a development that could rival, in magnitude, the impact of the fall of Iran's Shah in 1979. The fall of a relatively friendly government in Pakistan to pro-Taliban/pro-Al Qaeda elements would have far-reaching adverse ramifications. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and know-how. Such a capacity in the hands of militant pro-Taliban/pro-Al Qaeda elements would increase regional and global risks.

While President Bush should be careful to avoid statements or decisions that would place additional pressure on the embattled Musharraf government or a demand for elections in an environment in which hostile elements could well prevail, the overall situation and its enormous stakes strongly argue against a "hands off" approach by the United States.

The next President might well be required to make some critical choices. If a friendly opposition wins power through elections, assuming they are not canceled, the U.S. may well have to decide whether to deepen foreign assistance to that government. If elections are postponed or canceled, and pro-Taliban elements are poised to gain power, the U.S. might well have to make decisions as to whether to provide covert assistance to Pakistan.

If the U.S. is to have a reasonable opportunity to shape the evolution of events in a fashion that is compatible with promoting stability in south Asia and safeguarding its critical interests, it will need to play a diplomatic role, at a minimum, and perhaps a larger role that might include covert assistance. A "non-intervention" approach would treat the pro-Taliban elements, friendly opposition, and President Musharraf's government as essentially the same. It would apply strict neutrality and let Pakistan evolve as it does. The implications, of course, would differ markedly if a pro-Taliban leadership gained power in Pakistan. Therefore, this is yet another large international issue that strongly argues against a neo-isolationist U.S. approach to foreign policy.

Tehnitis55

I have been following the recent developments in Pakistan and agree with you that this is a serious issue. As Pakistan has been fairly cooperative with the United States, we should play a diplomtic role in supporting President Musharaf in this time of conflict. With our support, I believe that he will continue to remain ruler of this largly islamic country.

If the small possibility arises that an Al Queda linked govenment takes over in his stead, I believe that covert operations are the maximum extent of our involvment with this new government. A full out war is not an option in my opinion. We do not have the resources nor the political goodwill with the rest of the world to even dream of doing anything militarily.

Interesting Article though, and interesting points.

donsutherland1

Tehnitis55,

I agree with you. At this time, I don't believe the U.S. has a full military option in Pakistan, even if it wanted to do so. Moreover, such an operation would be unwise.

- The U.S. military is stretched thin and has too few combat troops to become significantly involved in Pakistan. It also has not yet found a decisive answer for insurgent/guerrilla warfare, and it would likely be exposed to substantial guerrilla warfare in Pakistan. An indecisive outcome would only further erode international perceptions of U.S. power and with the balance of power continuing to shift away from the U.S., would-be aggressors could well be tempted to take greater risks than otherwise would be the case.

- Any large U.S. military role in Pakistan could further undermine widely negative perceptions of the U.S. in the larger Islamic world. It would be highly dangerous to U.S. interests for moderate Muslims to join the radicals against the U.S. Such a development would have profound negative consequences for the U.S.

- Diplomatic support for President Musharraf would be a much better way to help him surmount the challenges currently confronting him. Economic assistance/foreign aid could augment the diplomatic support. Covert assistance should be provided only if it becomes necessary.

Tehnitis55

I agree with your assessment 100%.