World Situation Too Serious to Embrace Neo-Isolationism - Political Forum

donsutherland1 · 07-11-2007, 08:26 PM

Amidst the widespread public despair over the failures of the neoconservative intervention in Iraq, some Americans might be tempted to embrace a strict non-interventionist foreign policy. They should resist such a temptation. Neo-isolationism would only compromise the nation’s major global interests.

Neoconservatism failed strictly on account of its inherent flaws. It was little more than cleverly-packaged messianic idealism. It sought to remake the world through the application of military power and "regime change."

The end of the Cold War created an opening for neoconservative messianism based on a bold hypothesis that a new "Unipolar moment" during which the United States could use its unrivaled military power to democratize the world had arrived. The 9/11 terrorist attacks gave the Neoconservatives a chance to put their untested vision into practice. The failures in Iraq brought about the fall of Neoconservatism.

Neo-isolationism would not fix the problems unleashed by the neoconservative experiment. It would only imperil the United States’ ability to safeguard its critical interests abroad. If the U.S. were to disengage from the Middle East, that decision would have grave implications for Israel and moderate Arab states. It would leave a "black hole" of a failed state within Iraq’s borders in the heart of one of the world’s most vital oil-producing regions. Such a situation could further exacerbate sectarian strife within Iraq’s borders, possibly draw in outside states, accelerate Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony to the point of threatening the world economy's jugular vein that the region's oil abundance constitutes, leave a fertile environment in which Salafist extremists could strengthen their operations, and heighten the prospect of economic, human, or military catastrophes. A highly unstable Middle East or one that is increasingly dominated by Iran would dramatically raise the geopolitical risks confronting the United States and its allies.

In the wake of World War II, with Soviet power rising, Europe and Asia in ruins, President Truman understood the grave damage pre-World War II isolationism had facilitated. In March 1947, he set forth what became known as the Truman Doctrine. He declared, "One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations." Three months later, the United States launched a massive reconstruction plan to rebuild Europe.

The isolationists were outraged. They attacked the post-war role the U.S. was assuming. They attacked its proponents even as the Soviet Union grew more menacing. Against the backdrop of an increasingly shrill counterattack by the isolationists, Truman struck back. On February 19, 1948 he bluntly told the nation, "Conditions are too grave in the world at the present time to put an isolationist in the White House." The nation's people agreed and the isolationists were turned back in the 1948 elections.

Had Isolationism defined U.S. policy following World War II, there would have been no Marshall Plan or Asian reconstruction. Western Europe and Asia would be very different places today. Had Western Europe and Asia failed to recover from the ravages of World War II, the Soviet Union would have had a stronger opportunity to spread its totalitarianism. A new generation of extremist leaders in Europe and Asia could have risen to power over the grievances stemming from such an outcome. Instead, the stable and prosperous states that arose in Western Europe and East Asia provided economic, trade, political, and military benefits that far exceeded the costs of their reconstruction. Those benefits continue to flow to the U.S. even today.

To develop a viable foreign policy, the United States must resist the siren call of the neo-isolationists. Contrary to the myths one presently sees circulating online, isolationism is not the only foreign policy that is permissible under the U.S. Constitution. If anything, as the Constitution creates foreign policy powers, isolationism is incompatible with the Constitution. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution gives the President the "Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors..." Article VI Clause 2 declares, "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." It does not specify the content of such treaties. Such treaties could cover trade. They could cover security arrangements. They could concern economic assistance. Flexibility is the hallmark.

Even the nation's Founding Fathers did not proclaim an isolationist policy. In his farewell address, George Washington counseled, "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it." The italicized text is never mentioned by the neo-isolationists who invoke Washington's name in their cause. Yet, it is that qualifier that leaves the country the flexibility to enter into such alliances if the world changes so as to make such an arrangement necessary. At the time, he postulated that only temporary alliances might be necessary "for extraordinary emergencies." Still, in his wisdom, he left an opening for permanent alliances. At the same time, he made abundantly clear that U.S. foreign policy serve the U.S. national interest, not the peripheral interests of other states, particularly "the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice" that have no relationship to the U.S. national interest. At the time of his Farewell Address, Washington observed, "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation." Today, there are large common interests.

Furthermore, America's first Presidents had a fairly active foreign policy. In discussing early American diplomacy, Henry Kissinger observed:

Ironically, our Founding Fathers were sophisticated statesmen who understood the European balance of power and manipulated it brilliantly, first to bring about America's independence and then to preserve it. The shrewd diplomacy of Franklin and Jefferson engaged Britain's enemies (France, Spain, and Russia) on our side; our negotiating hand thus strengthened, John Jay secured recognition from the British Crown and liquidated the residual problems of our war with England.

Therefore, in the 2008 elections, instead of lurching wildly from the neoconservatism to neo-isolationism, the United States should return to the pragmatic Realism that guided Presidents Truman through Reagan. Pragmatic Realism (realpolitik with a dose of idealism) helped bring a successful conclusion to the Cold War in a peaceful fashion. It can work just as well today.

A pragmatic Realist foreign policy would feature the “Containment” of hostile powers, robust diplomacy for addressing threats and realizing shared opportunities, renewed collaboration with NATO allies, diplomatic and economic engagement with the world’s leading states, and a return to the traditional doctrine of military pre-emption. "Regime Change," unilateralism, and unchecked idealism would be discarded. At the same time, the kind of pre-World War II neutrality that failed to distinguish between belligerents and victims of naked aggression and its isolationist framework that abandoned critical U.S. interests and allies would not be reincarnated from history's graveyard.

Neo-isolationism—a "knee-jerk" reaction to the neoconservative failure in Iraq—would be naive and highly counterproductive. Such an approach could work only if the U.S. were wholly self-sufficient and had solely local interests to safeguard. The reality is that the U.S. is interdependent and has major global interests. It simply cannot abandon them except at great risk to its security, constitutional framework, and citizens.

Purple Tang · 07-11-2007, 10:34 PM

That is the most hilarious trype I have seen in some time. This is the work of a neo-con guard guard employed for their ability to assemble partisan attack disguised as serious dialogue.

With the future of the NWO at stake, this can only be taken as opening volleys.

donsutherland1 · 07-11-2007, 11:10 PM

Thanks Neorealist. I wrote that post.

donsutherland1 · 07-11-2007, 11:29 PM

Purple Tang,

Just so it is clear, I strongly subscribe to the sovereign nation-state. In no way am I advocating a single global government. Such an outcome could only lead to too much power being concentrated in the hands of too few to the detriment of individual liberty. Having said that, sovereign states can collaborate when they have in common important interests and such collaboration does not destroy their sovereignty.

prrriiide · 07-12-2007, 01:32 AM

Interesting post.

What you fail to mention is that the Truman Doctrine is the very doctrine that was severely mis-used starting with the Eisenhower administration as the carte blanche to meddle directly in the political affairs of other nations. This very meddling is the over-riding reason that so many in the middle east hate the US. That was the doctrine used to justify the deposing of Mossadegh in Iran in favor of the Shah. It was the justification used to install the B'aath in Iraq in '68.

While the Truman Doctrine sounds good in the abstract, in practice it has been completely mis-used by administrations for 1/2 a century.

Isolationism is not the answer, and neither is the idea that military or covert means of regime change are in the best long-term interests of the US. The answer is reaching out to those countries with whom we have mutual interests, whether we like the regime or not. It is only through reaching out (as the US did in post-WWII Europe and Asia) that we have the inroads to the population at-large, and therefore access to their hearts and minds.

What we have been trying to do with our foreign policy is akin to beating someone to a pulp until they profess their undying admiration for us. The old saw hold true: if you want a friend, be one.

Rick · 07-12-2007, 01:52 AM

Quote:

President Truman understood the grave damage pre-World War II isolationism had facilitated.

And that was exactly what??

donsutherland1 · 07-12-2007, 07:59 AM

Rick,

You asked about the damage pre-World War II isolationism facilitated. American isolationism directly created an asymmetrical imbalance of power in favor of Germany. Practioners of Realpolitik understand the implications of a balance of power that is skewed in favor of an aggressive state. Neoconserveratives have some understanding of the importance of power, but they get lost in marrying power to utopian pursuits to remake the world, and those pursuits invariably lead to overstretch. Liberal internationalists disdain the role of power. Instead, they support multilateral institutions. Yet, multilateral institutions can only complement power, they cannot subsitute for it or compensate for its absence. Isolationists, by withdrawing from the world at large on account of their exceptionally narrow world perspective, create destablizing power vacuums that increase geopolitical risk.

In the years leading up to World War II, Hitler’s and Mussolini’s growing ambitions, excessive German and Italian nationalism, and British and French appeasement, and American isolationism, all converged to greatly accelerate increases in Germany’s and Italy’s demands. Nazi Germany’s demands increased from militarization of the Rhineland to incorporation of Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland area to occupation of all of Czechoslovakia to annexation of Danzig to conquest of most of Poland to possession of African colonies. Italy demanded an end to its Versailles Treaty obligations and later possession of Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and Tunisia. Afterward, both states later made it their mission to create a "new Europe."

In the end, American isolationism was a contributing factor in the events that followed. Each new "investment" in isolationist legislation or policy that further altered the balance of power in the favor of Germany, Italy, and Japan, produced a new "dividend" of aggression.

In the past, there was the naive belief that isolationism could give one security. The pre-World War II experience demonstrated otherwise. For example, in October 1936, Belgium succumbed to the belief that isolationism could bring it security. In doing so, Belgium's government declared:

Our military policy as well as our foreign policy must be designed not to prepare for a war more or less victorious as a result of a coalition, but to keep war from our territory... Our policy must aim solely at placing us outside the quarrels of our neighbors.

On May 10, 1940, in spite of Belgium's neutrality, Germany invaded the tiny country.

Today, one hears from the neo-isolationist camp some arguments that are startlingly similar to those made by Belgium's government. History offers a sobering lesson to the contrary. Power matters.

Therefore, one should not assume that would-be aggressors would be bound by the terms of treaties to which they agree or proclamations of neutrality by would-be targets. Such nations typically leave a trail of broken promises in their wake and they exploit signals of weakness, as their appetite for conquest drives them relentlessly forward. Each new success only furthers that appetite. Then, war that might have been prevented by a robust balance of power arrayed against the aggressor, becomes inevitable.

Hotduck · 07-13-2007, 06:11 PM

Great post isolationism has never worked on never will that I agree with what I don’t agree with is going back to the Containment policy that’s never either in fact it was one of the reasons 9/11 happened thinking you can Contain evils like UBL Saddom and others is foolish its worth a shot but ever a wile if nothing changes you to comfort threats head on an get rid of the evil threat

donsutherland1 · 07-13-2007, 06:46 PM

Hotduck,

Containment is only one element of the foreign policy framework. When it comes to the ongoing ideological struggle with radical Islamist terrorism, the campaign needs to be focused, comprehensive and decisive.

State sponsors of terrorism need to be contained so as to deny terrorist groups safe haven. Security and Intelligence cooperation needs to be pursued. Robust public diplomacy that counters the propaganda of groups such as Al Qaeda and builds ties with moderate Muslims needs to be developed and implemented. Foreign assistance, particularly for countries that face economic deprivation, needs to be provided, as economic volatility can give extremists a potent opportunity to argue that the U.S./West is responsible for a bad situation. In the end, if one wins the ideological component of the struggle, the rest of the elements e.g., the collapse of the movements behind the terrorism, will fall into place.

Occasionally, military power will likely need to be applied. However, the application of military power should be consistent with the traditional American posture: either the U.S. is attacked (Al Qaeda did so) or its critical interests are at imminent threat of attack. While such criteria would rule out the 2003 war in Iraq--the CIA had "high confidence" that Iraq possessed WMD but its information suggested that it posed no imminent threat to critical U.S. interests--it would help ensure that the U.S. remains highly focused. At the same time, the "Powell Doctrine" of overwhelming force and a reasonable exit strategy should be employed.

At last word, the total cost of the Iraq intervention is approaching $500 billion. The intervention has been so costly that it has sapped resources that might otherwise have gone into Afghanistan. Moreover, as the war/post-war has been directed using borrowed funds, there are long-term opportunity costs associated with it. At the same time, as the outcome was not a decisive U.S. victory, U.S. military credibility has been diminished. In turn, this has altered would-be enemies' calculations of U.S. power and reduced their incentives to cooperate with the U.S.

Power truly does matter. Not surprisingly, Iran is now making noise about some islands that belong to the UAE.

Clearly,the Iraq issue is going to need to be resolved. However, neither the Congress nor the President appear willing to confront what may well be the heart of the problem: the absence of an acceptable political solution at present. Congress is clamoring to rush troop withdrawals. President Bush wants to maintain an essentially military strategy for the foreseeable future.

In my view, what Iraq needs is a legitimate and accountable government and neither Congress nor the President appear inclined to work toward that outcome. A conference modeled after that which took place in Bonn to form the transitional Afghanistan government would offer a reasonable approach for proceeding toward such an outcome. Such a conference would be hosted by the United Nations (UN), Arab League, and/or Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). It would be attended by Iraq's factions, and it would also involve all of Iraq's neighbors and the United States. Such a conference would aim to create a pluralistic legal framework that protects minority rights, guarantees full political participation by all Iraqis, precludes the kind of domination by the Shia that would put them in a position to oppress Iraq's other peoples, and provides a sharing of oil revenue. Such a conference would establish a transitional Iraqi government that would be comprised of all of Iraq's factions. Later, once Iraq has been able to build political, economic, and legal institutions, future governments would be elected.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advised, "an intensified negotiation among the Iraqi parties; a regional forum like the Sharm el-Sheikh conference to elaborate an international transition status for Iraq; and a broader conference to establish the peacekeeping and verification dimensions." In March 2007, the Arab League also called for such an arrangement.

The U.S. can ill-afford to continue to ignore the reality that the Maliki government is little more than a sectarian regime working toward sectarian objectives. That, more than anything else, is the reason there has been virtually no political progress. The Maliki government seeks to impose maximum conditions on Iraq's other peoples. Hence, differences are not bridged and reconciliation is not pursued.

In contrast, once a meaningful political solution is realized, violence will drop off markedly, as Al Qaeda will be responsible for most/all the violence. A united Iraq will be in a better position to combat this nihilistic enemy. As stability increases, then U.S. troop withdrawals will become feasible without the risk of further destabilizing the region's balance of power.

rob_anderson · 07-13-2007, 10:29 PM

America firsters prefer the term "non-interventionism." It is the "way, the truth, and the light" and the only path to a better future for America. We must disengage from all these foreign lands and put America first!

We have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies.